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Much debate on party system formation in post-communist East Central Europe has 
been clouded by difficulties reconciling clearly relevant, but often conflicting, 
cultural, historical and political factors, as well as by a lack of sustained comparative 
research in the region itself. Post-Communist Party Systems addresses both these 
deficiencies, developing a powerful comparative synthesis and applying it 
systematically to four national cases studies: the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland 
and Bulgaria.  
There are, the authors argue in Part I, two key issues to examine and account for when 
studying post-communist party systems: (1) the extent to which they are 
programmatically structured (rather than based  on clientelism or charismatic 
leadership); and (2) variation in the structure of party competition in East Central 
Europe between cases. Both will, the authors argue, vary according to complex 
historical legacies embracing both the pre-communist and communist periods, as 
modified by institutional and economic choices made after transition. Their 
comparative typology sketches  a series of historical pathways turning around several 
key variables:  the level of country’s social and political modernity before 
communism, it is argued, determines the type of communist rule it experienced; this 
in turn influences its mode of transition’ from communism in 1989; modes of 
transition (modified by transitional élites’ post-1989 institutional choices) then shapes 
party system formation. 
Pre-war social and economic modernity (including mass labour movements), which 
existed, for example, in Czechoslovakia, it is argued, produces tough ‘bureaucratic-
authoritarian’ communism. In less advanced states such as Hungary and Poland, 
weaker (and hence more reform-inclined ‘national-accommodative’) regimes emerge. 
By contrast, the historically least advanced states in South Eastern Europe, such as 
Bulgaria, develop a repressive, clientelistic and  reform-averse form of ‘patrimonial 
communism’.  
By determining the distribution of actors, resources and incentives, each communist 
regime type also bequeaths a particular mode of transition from communism. Thus, 
while the ‘national-accommodative’ regimes of Hungary and Poland extricated 
themselves through negotiated transition with semi-legal oppositions in 1989, 
Czechoslovakia’s hardline ‘bureaucratic-authoritarian’ regime imploded under 
popular pressure. By contrast, Bulgaria’s ‘patrimonial communism’ had so neutralised 
opposition and social pressures that the ruling communists managed transition as ‘pre-
emptive strike’ and thus remain in the political game.  
Accumulated legacies of the pre-communist period, communism and the transition 
then finally shape the format of post-communist party systems. In the former 
‘national-accommodative’ regimes of Hungary and Poland, incomplete pre-
communist modernisation and broad regime-opposition consensus on the need for 
economic reform after 1989 produce a party system based on crosscutting cleavages 
over non-economic ‘value’ issues making politics a three-cornered fight between 
liberals, ex-communist ‘social democrats’ and national-populists. Former ‘patrimonial 
communist’ states such as Bulgaria, see a loosely structured bi-polar party system 
opposing a pro-market, anti-communist and anti-market ex-communist blocs. Only in 
a formerly ‘bureaucratic authoritarian’ regime, such as Czechoslovakia  (later the 
Czech Republic) - with no ‘national-accommodation’ before 1989 and no surviving 
communist élites after 1989 - is a  conventional party politics of left and right based 
on  distributional issues emerge to be anticipated. 
In Parts II - IV the authors test these hypotheses using a variety of statistical 
techniques to analyse data from a cross-national surveys of specialists, party élites and 
party functionaries and opinion polling from in 1993-4. Their findings suggest that 
neither Downsian explanations seeing party system format as a product of competitive 
equilibria or institutional  approaches highlighting the incentives of electoral systems 
properly explain variations in programmatic structuring between cases. Thus, rather 
than having a diffuse catch-all appeal as a Downsian approaches predict, electorally 
dominant parties in the three Central Europe cases are programmatically the most 
cohesive and distinct parties. Conversely, the weaknesses of  programmatic 
structuring in Bulgarian party politics cannot be explained institutionally, by the 
incentives offered by Bulgaria’s electoral system given these are similar in the three 
Central European cases. As far as patterns of competition are concerned, the book’s 
empirical analysis broadly confirms the predictions of its comparative framework, 
although party-élites overstate socio-political cleavages compared to mass electorates. 
Nevertheless, electorates in the region generally exhibit a degree of ‘programmatic 
structuring’ not dissimilar to that in Western Europe, suggesting that much received 
wisdom about the inchoateness of post-communist public opinion is overstated.  
However, do such broadly representative and responsive post-communist party 
systems offer effective governance? There is, suggests the analysis in Part V, no clear 
relationship between the two, although the persistence of a strong regime-opposition 
cleavage (as in Bulgaria) or, a of lack of polarisation around economic issues (as in 
former ‘national-accommodative’ Hungary) may make the formation of stable, 
programmatically coherent coalitions more difficult. The book conclusions firm rebut 
both generic models and tabula rasa theories of post-communist politics. In form if 
not content, the authors argue, party systems in East Central Europe are comparable 
with those in Western Europe and research agendas should therefore shift towards the 
quality and consequences (rather than the mere sustainability) of post-communist 
democracy in the region. 
Post-Communist Party Systems makes its central point - that legacies matter in post-
communist party formation and that legacies and diverse - with great theoretical 
virtuosity and methodological rigour. Its substantive findings both confirm and 
elaborate earlier, more fragmentary research and link them in to wider questions 
concerning post-communist democracy. Its call for a more fully comparative politics 
of Western and Eastern Europe is both welcome and overdue. However, the book’s 
framework of comparative historical legacies is, despite its sophistication, perhaps too 
neat in glossing over awkward moments of political contingency in the history of East 
Central Europe, that do not fit its schema. To take one example, the ‘bureaucratic 
authoritarian’ nature of the Czechoslovak regime in 1989, while undoubtedly related 
to the country’s pre-communist administrative and social modernity, was as much a 
consequence of politics as deep historical structures: but for the narrowly taken 
decision of the Brezhnev’s politburo to invade Czechoslovakia in 1968, the ‘Prague 
Spring’ would probably have retrenched into a ‘national-accommodative’ regime, 
similar to that of  Hungary not ‘bureaucratic authoritarianism’. 
Despite conceding that legacies may fade in time and that the institutional choices and 
economic strategies adopted by reflexive political actors do play a role, the book’s 
underlying explanation seems overly deterministic. Are the party politics of East 
Central Europe in the 1990s really ultimately products of the social structures of the 
1930s? The book also disappoints in its failure to consider party-society links 
institutionally other than as a brief afterthought and in ignoring party-interest group 
links completely. On the whole, however, its strengths clearly outweigh its 
weaknesses. Although greater in theoretical sweep than in the empirically-backed 
conclusions it can offer, the book thus represents an important milestone. 
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